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This article gives a brief introduction to reputation eﬀects. A
canonical model is described, the reputation bound result of Fuden-
berg and Levine (1989, 1992) and the temporary reputation result of
Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004, 2007) are stated and discussed.
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Glossary:
action type a type of player who is committed to playing a particular
action, also called a commitment type or behavioral type.
complete information characteristics of all players are common knowl-
edge.
ﬂow payoﬀ stage game payoﬀ
imperfect monitoring past actions of all players are not public informa-
tion.
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1incomplete information characteristics of some player are not common
knowledge.
long-lived player player subject to intertemporal incentives, typically has
the same horizon as length of the game.
myopic optimum an action maximizing stage game payoﬀs.
Nash equilibrium a strategy proﬁle from which no player has a proﬁtable
unilateral deviation (i.e., it is self-enforcing).
Nash reversion in a repeated game, permanent play of a stage game Nash
equilibrium.
normalized discounted value The discounted sum of an inﬁnite sequence
{at}t≥0, calculated as (1−δ)
P
t≥0 δtat, where δ ∈ (0,1) is the discount
value.
perfect monitoring past actions of all players are public information.
repeated game the ﬁnite or inﬁnite repetition of a stage game.
reputation bound the lower bound on equilibrium payoﬀs of a player that
the other player(s) believe may be a a simple action type (typically
the Stackelberg type).
short-lived player player not subject to intertemporal incentives, having
a one-period horizon and so is myopically optimizing.
simple action type an action who plays the same (pure or mixed) stage-
game action in every period, regardless of history.
stage game a game played in one period.
Stackelberg action in a stage game, the action a player would commit to,
if that player had the chance to do so, i.e., the optimal commitment
action.
Stackelberg type a simple action type that plays the Stackelberg action.
subgame in a repeated game with perfect monitoring, the game following
any history.
subgame perfect equilibrium a strategy proﬁle that induces a Nash equi-
librium on every subgame of the original game.
type the characteristic of a player that is not common knowledge.
21 Deﬁnition
Repeated games have many equilibria, including the repetition of stage game
Nash equilibria. At the same time, particularly when monitoring is imper-
fect, certain plausible outcomes are not consistent with equilibrium. Rep-
utation eﬀects is the term used for the impact upon the set of equilibria
(typically of a repeated game) of perturbing the game by introducing incom-
plete information of a particular kind. Speciﬁcally, the characteristics of a
player are not public information, and the other players believe it is possible
that the distinguished player is a type that necessarily plays some action
(typically the Stackelberg action). Reputation eﬀects fall into two classes:
“Plausible” phenomena that are not equilibria of the original repeated game
are equilibrium phenomena in the presence of incomplete information, and
“implausible” equilibria of the original game are not equilibria of the incom-
plete information game. As such, reputation eﬀects provide an important
qualiﬁcation to the general indeterminacy of equilibria.
2 Introduction
Repeating play of a stage game often allows for equilibrium behavior incon-
sistent with equilibrium of that stage game. If the stage game has multiple
Nash equilibrium payoﬀs, a large ﬁnite number of repetitions provide suf-
ﬁcient intertemporal incentives for behavior inconsistent with stage-game
Nash equilibria to arise in some subgame perfect equilibria. However, many
classic games do not have multiple Nash equilibria. For example, mutual
defection DD is the unique Nash equilibrium of the prisoners’ dilemma,




Figure 1: The prisoners’ dilemma. The cooperative action is labeled C,
while defect is labeled D.
A standard argument shows that the ﬁnitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma
has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium, and in this equilibrium, DD is
played in every period: In any subgame perfect equilibrium, in the last pe-
riod, DD must be played independently of history, since the stage game
3has a unique Nash equilibrium. Then, since play in the last period is inde-
pendent of history, there are no intertemporal incentives in the penultimate
period, and so DD must again be played independently of history. Pro-
ceeding recursively, DD must be played in every period independently of
history. (In fact, the ﬁnitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma has a unique Nash
equilibrium outcome, given by DD in every period.)
This contrasts with intuition, which suggests that if the prisoners’ dilemma
were repeated a suﬃciently large (though ﬁnite) number of times, the two
players would ﬁnd a way to play cooperatively (C) at least in the initial
stages. In response, Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson (1982) argued
that intuition can be rescued in the ﬁnitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma
by introducing incomplete information. In particular, suppose each player
assigns some probability to their opponent being a behavioral type who
mechanistically plays tit-for-tat (i.e., plays C in the ﬁrst period or if the
opponent had played C in the previous period, and plays D if the opponent
had played D in the previous period) rather than being a rational player.
No matter how small the probability, if the number of repetitions is large
enough, the rational players will play C in early periods, and the fraction of
periods in which CC is played is close to one.
This is the ﬁrst example of a reputation eﬀect: a small degree of incom-
plete information (of the right kind) both rescues the intuitive CC for many
periods as an equilibrium outcome, and eliminates the unintuitive always
DD as one. In the same issue of the Journal of Economic Theory contain-
ing Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson (1982), Kreps and Wilson (1982)
and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) explored reputation eﬀects in the ﬁnite
chain store of Selten (1978), showing that intuition is again rescued, this
time by introducing the possibility that the chain store is a “tough” type
who always ﬁghts entry.
Reputation eﬀects describe the impact upon the set of equilibria of the
introduction of small amounts of incomplete information of a particular form
into repeated games (and other dynamic games). Reputation eﬀects fall into
two classes: “Plausible” phenomena that are not equilibria of the complete
information game are equilibrium phenomena in the presence of incomplete
information, and “implausible” equilibria of the complete information game
are not equilibria of the incomplete information game.
Reputation eﬀects are distinct from the equilibrium phenomenon in com-
plete information repeated games that are sometimes described as capturing
reputations. In this latter use, an equilibrium of the complete information
repeated game is selected, involving actions along the equilibrium path that




Figure 2: The product-choice game.
these actions are created by attaching less favorable continuation paths to
deviations. Players who choose the equilibrium actions are then interpreted
as maintaining a reputation for doing so, with a punishment-triggering de-
viation interpreted as causing the loss of one’s reputation. For example,
players who cooperate in the inﬁnitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma are in-
terpreted as having (or maintaining) a cooperative reputation, with any
defection destroying that reputation. In this usage, the link between past
behavior and expectations of future behavior is an equilibrium phenomenon,
holding in some equilibria, but not in others. The notion of reputation is
used to interpret an equilibrium strategy proﬁle, but otherwise adds nothing
to the formal analysis.
In contrast, the approach underlying reputation eﬀects begins with the
assumption that a player is uncertain about key aspects of her opponent.
For example, player 2 may not know player 1’s payoﬀs, or may be uncer-
tain about what constraints player 1 faces on his ability to choose various
actions. This incomplete information is a device that introduces an intrin-
sic connection between past behavior and expectations of future behavior.
Since incomplete information about players’ characteristics can have dra-
matic eﬀects on the set of equilibrium payoﬀs, reputations in this approach
do not describe certain equilibria, but rather place constraints on the set of
possible equilibria.
2.1 An Example
While reputation eﬀects were ﬁrst studied in a symmetric example with
two long-lived players, they arise in their purest form in inﬁnitely repeated
games with one long-lived player playing against a sequence of short-lived
players. The chain store game of Selten (1978) is a ﬁnitely repeated game in
which a chain store (the long-lived player) faces a ﬁnite sequence of potential
entrants in its diﬀerent markets. Since each entrant only cares about its own
decision, it is short-lived.
Consider the “product-choice” game of Figure 2. The row player (player
51), who is long-lived, is a ﬁrm choosing between high (H) and low (L) eﬀort,
while the column player (player 2), who is short-lived, is a customer choosing
between a high (h) or low (`) priced product. (Mailath and Samuelson
(2006) illustrate various aspects of repeated games and reputation eﬀects
using this example.) Player 2 prefers the high-priced product if the ﬁrm
has exerted high eﬀort, but prefers the low-priced product if the ﬁrm has
not. The ﬁrm prefers that customers purchase the high-priced product and
is willing to commit to high eﬀort to induce that choice by the customer.
In a simultaneous move game, however, the ﬁrm cannot observably choose
eﬀort before the customer chooses the product. Since high eﬀort is costly,
the ﬁrm prefers low eﬀort, no matter the choice of the customer.
The stage game has a unique Nash equilibrium, in which the ﬁrm exerts
low eﬀort and the customer purchases the low-priced product. Suppose the
game is played inﬁnitely often, with perfect monitoring (i.e., the history of
play is public information). The ﬁrm is long-lived and discounts ﬂow proﬁts
by the discount factor δ ∈ (0,1), and is patient if δ is close to 1. The role of
the customer is taken by a succession of short-lived players, each of whom
plays the game only once (and so myopically optimizes). It is standard to
abuse language by treating the collection of short-lived players as a single
myopically optimizing player.
When the ﬁrm is suﬃciently patient, there is an equilibrium outcome in
the repeated game in which the ﬁrm always exerts high eﬀort and customers
always purchase the high-priced product. The ﬁrm is deterred from taking
the immediate myopically optimal action of low eﬀort by the prospect of
future customers then purchasing the low-priced product. Purchasing the
high-priced product is a best response for the customer to high eﬀort, so
that no incentive issues arise concerning the customer’s behavior. In this
equilibrium, the long-lived player’s payoﬀ is 2 (the ﬁrm’s payoﬀs are cal-
culated as the normalized discounted sum, i.e., as the discounted sum of
ﬂow payoﬀs normalized by (1 − δ), so that payoﬀs in the inﬁnite horizon
game are comparable to ﬂow payoﬀs). However, there are many other equi-
libria, including one in which low eﬀort is exerted and low price purchased
in every period, leading to a payoﬀ of 1 for the long-lived player. Indeed,
for δ ≥ 1/2, the set of pure-strategy subgame-perfect-equilibrium player 1
payoﬀs is given by the entire interval [1,2].
Reputation eﬀects eﬀectively rule out any payoﬀ less than 2 as an equi-
librium payoﬀ for player 1. Suppose customers are not entirely certain of
the characteristics of the ﬁrm. More speciﬁcally, suppose they attach high
probability to the ﬁrm’s being “normal,” that is, having the payoﬀs given
above, but they also entertain some (possibly very small) probability that
6they face a ﬁrm who fortuitously has a technology or some other character-
istic that ensures high eﬀort. Refer to the latter as the “H-action” type of
ﬁrm. Since such a type necessarily plays H in every period, it is a type de-
scribed by behavior (not payoﬀs), and such a type is often called a behavioral
or commitment type.
This is now a game of incomplete information, with the customers un-
certain of the ﬁrm’s type. Since the customers assign high probability to
the ﬁrm being “normal,” the game is in some sense close to the game of
complete information. None the less, reputation eﬀects are present: For a
suﬃciently patient ﬁrm, in any Nash equilibrium of the repeated game, the
ﬁrm’s payoﬀ cannot be signiﬁcantly less than 2. This result holds no matter
how unlikely customers think the H-action type to be, though increasing
patience is required from the normal ﬁrm as the action type becomes less
likely.
The intuition behind this result is most easily seen by considering pure
strategy Nash equilibria of the incomplete information game where the cus-
tomers believe the ﬁrm is either the normal or the H-action type. In that
case, there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium with a payoﬀ less than 2δ
(which is clearly close to 2 for δ close to 1). In the pure strategy Nash
equilibrium, either the ﬁrm always plays H, (in which case, the customers
always play h and the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ is 2), or there is a ﬁrst period (say t) in
which the ﬁrm plays L, revealing to future customers that he is the normal
type (since the action type plays H in every period). In such an equilibrium,
customers play h before t (since both types of ﬁrm are choosing H). After
observing H in period t, customers conclude the ﬁrm is the H-action type.
Consequently, as long as H is always chosen thereafter, customers subse-
quently play h (since they continue to believe the ﬁrm is the H-action type,
and so necessarily plays H). An easy lower bound on the normal ﬁrm’s equi-
librium payoﬀ is then obtained by observing that the normal ﬁrm’s payoﬀ
must be at least the payoﬀ from mimicking the action type in every period.






payoﬀ in τ < t from pooling
with H-action type
+ (1 − δ)δt × 0
| {z }
payoﬀ in t from playing H when
L may be myopically optimal





payoﬀ in τ > t from playing like
and being treated as the H-action type
=(1 − δt)2 + δt+12
=2 − 2δt(1 − δ)
≥2 − 2(1 − δ) = 2δ.
The outcome in which the stage game Nash equilibrium L` is played in
every period is thus eliminated.
Since reputation eﬀects are motivated by the hypothesis that the short-
lived players are uncertain about some aspect of the long-lived player’s char-
acteristics, it is important that the results are not sensitive to the precise
nature of that uncertainty. In particular, the lower bound on payoﬀs should
not require that the short-lived players only assign positive probability to
the normal and the H-action type (as in the game just analyzed). And it
does not: The customers in the example may assign positive probability to
the ﬁrm being an action type that plays H on even periods, and L on odd
periods, as well as to an action type that plays H in every period before
some period t0 (that can depend on history), and then always plays L. Yet,
as long as the customers assign positive probability to the H-action type,
for a suﬃciently patient ﬁrm, in any Nash equilibrium of the repeated game,
the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ cannot be signiﬁcantly less than 2.
Reputation eﬀects are more powerful in the presence of imperfect mon-
itoring. Suppose that the ﬁrm’s choice of H or L is not observed by the
customers. Instead, the customers observe a public signal y ∈ {
¯
y, ¯ y} at the
end of each period, where the signal ¯ y is realized with probability p ∈ (0,1)
if the ﬁrm chose H, and with the smaller probability q ∈ (0,p) if the ﬁrm
chose L. Interpret ¯ y as a good meal: while customers do not observe eﬀort,
they do observe a noisy signal (the quality of the meal) of that eﬀort, with
high eﬀort leading to a good meal with higher probability. In the game with
complete information, the largest equilibrium payoﬀ to the ﬁrm is now given
by




reﬂecting the imperfect monitoring of the ﬁrm’s actions (the ﬁrm is said
to be subject to binding moral hazard, see Mailath and Samuelson (2006,
8section 7.6)). Since deviations from H cannot be detected for sure, there are
no equilibria with the deterministic outcome path of Hh in every period. In
some periods after some histories, L` must be played in order to provide the
appropriate intertemporal incentives to the ﬁrm.
As under perfect monitoring, as long as customers assign positive prob-
ability to the H-action type in the incomplete information game with im-
perfect monitoring, for a suﬃciently patient ﬁrm, in any Nash equilibrium
of the repeated game, the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ cannot be signiﬁcantly less than 2
(in particular, this lower bound exceeds ¯ v1). Thus, in this case, reputation
eﬀects provide an intuitive lower bound on equilibrium payoﬀs that both
rules out “bad” equilibrium payoﬀs, as well as rescues outcomes in which
Hh occurs in most periods.
Proving that a reputation bound holds in the imperfect monitoring case
is considerably more involved than in the perfect monitoring case. In perfect-
monitoring games, it is only necessary to analyze the evolution of the cus-
tomers’ beliefs when always observing H, the action of the H-action type.
In contrast, imperfect monitoring requires consideration of belief evolution
on all histories that arise with positive probability.
None the less, the intuition is the same: Consider a putative equilibrium
in which the normal ﬁrm receives a payoﬀ less than 2−ε. Then the normal
and action types must be making diﬀerent choices over the course of the
repeated game, since an equilibrium in which they behave identically would
induce customers to choose h and would yield a payoﬀ of 2. As in the perfect
monitoring case, the normal ﬁrm has the option of mimicking the behavior
of the H-action type. Suppose the normal ﬁrm does so. Since the customers
expect the normal type of ﬁrm to behave diﬀerently from the H-action type,
they will more often see signals indicative of the H-action type (rather than
the normal type), and so must eventually become convinced that the ﬁrm is
the H-action type. Hence, in response to this deviation, the customers will
eventually play their best response to H of h. While “eventually” may take
a while, that time is independent of the equilibrium (indeed of the discount
factor), depending only on the imperfection in the monitoring and the prior
probability assigned to the H-action type. Then, if the ﬁrm is suﬃciently
patient, the payoﬀ from mimicking the H-action type is arbitrarily close to
2, contradicting the existence of an equilibrium in which the ﬁrm’s payoﬀ
fell short of 2 − ε.
At the same time, because monitoring is imperfect, as discussed in Sec-
tion 3.5, the reputation eﬀects are necessarily transient. Under general con-
ditions in imperfect-monitoring games, the incomplete information that is
at the core of reputation eﬀects is a short-run phenomenon. Player 2 must
9eventually come to learn player 1’s type and continuation play must converge
to an equilibrium of the complete information game.
Reputation eﬀects arise for very general speciﬁcations of the incomplete
information as long as the customers assign strictly positive probability to
the H-action type. It is critical, however, that the customers do assign
strictly positive probability to the H-action type. For example, in the
product-choice game, the set of Nash equilibria of the repeated game is
not signiﬁcantly impacted by the possibility that the ﬁrm is either normal
or the L-action type only. While reputation eﬀects per se do not arise from
the L-action type, it is still of interest to investigate the impact of such
uncertainty on behavior using stronger equilibrium notions, such as Markov
perfection (see Mailath and Samuelson (2001)).
3 A Canonical Model
3.1 The Stage Game
The stage game is a two-player simultaneous-move ﬁnite game of public
monitoring. Player i has action set Ai, i = 1,2. Pure actions for player i are
denoted by ai ∈ Ai, and mixed actions are denoted by αi ∈ ∆(Ai), where
∆(Ai) is the set of probability distributions over Ai. Player 2’s actions are
public, while player 1’s are potentially private. The public signal of player
1’s action, denoted by y is drawn from a ﬁnite set Y , with the probability
that y is realized under the pure action proﬁle a ∈ A ≡ A1 × A2 denoted
by ρ(y | a). Player 1’s ex post payoﬀ from the action proﬁle a and signal
realization y is r1(y,a), and so the ex ante (or expected) ﬂow payoﬀ is
u1(a) ≡
P
y r1(y,a)ρ(y | a). Player 2’s ex post payoﬀ from the action proﬁle
a and signal realization y is r2(y,a2), and so the ex ante (or expected)
ﬂow payoﬀ is u2(a) ≡
P
y r2(y,a2)ρ(y | a). Since player 2’s ex post payoﬀ
is independent of player 1’s actions, player 1’s actions only aﬀect player
2’s payoﬀs through the impact on the distribution of the signals and so
on ex ante payoﬀs. While the ex post payoﬀs ri play no explicit role in
the analysis, they justify the informational assumptions to be made. In
particular, the model requires that histories of signals and past actions are
the only information players receive, and so it is important that stage game
payoﬀs ui are not informative about the action choice (and this is the critical
feature delivered by the assumptions that ex ante payoﬀs are not observable
and that payer 2’s ex post payoﬀs do not depend on a1).
Perfect monitoring is the special case where Y = A1 and ρ(y | a) = 1 if
y = a1, and 0 otherwise.
10The results in this section hold under signiﬁcantly weaker monitoring
assumptions. In particular, it is not necessary that the actions of player 2
be public. If these are also imperfectly monitored, then the ex post payoﬀ
for player 1 is independent of player 2 actions. Since player 2 is short-lived,
when player 2 are not public, it is then natural to also assume that the
period t player 2 does not know earlier player 2’s actions.
3.2 The Complete Information Repeated Game
The stage game is inﬁnitely repeated. Player 1 is long-lived, with payoﬀs
given by the normalized discounted value (1−δ)
P∞
t=0 δtut
1, where δ ∈ (0,1)
is the discount factor and ut
1 is player 1’s period t ﬂow payoﬀ. Player 1 is
patient if δ is close to 1. As in our example, the role of player 2 is taken by
a succession of short-lived players, each of whom plays the game only once
(and so myopically optimizes).
Player 1’s set of private histories is H1 ≡ ∪∞
t=0(Y × A)t and the set
of public histories (which coincides with the set of player 2’s histories) is
H ≡ ∪∞
t=0(Y × A2)t. If the game has perfect monitoring, histories h =
(y0,a0;y1,a1;...;yt−1,at−1) in which yτ 6= aτ
1 for some τ ≤ t − 1 arise
with zero probability, independently of behavior, and so can be ignored.
A strategy σ1 for player 1 speciﬁes a probability distribution over 1’s pure
action set for each possible private history, i.e., σ1 : H1 → ∆(A1). A strategy
σ2 for player 2 speciﬁes a probability distribution over 2’s pure action set
for each possible public history, i.e., σ2 : H → ∆(A2).
Deﬁnition 1 The strategy proﬁle (σ∗
1,σ∗
2) is a Nash equilibrium if
1. there does not exist a strategy σ1 yielding a strictly higher payoﬀ for
player 1 when player 2 plays σ∗
2, and






1),a1) | ht], where
the expectation is taken over the period t-private histories that player
1 may have observed.
3.3 The Incomplete Information Repeated Game
In the incomplete information game, the type of player 1 is unknown to
player 2. A possible type of player 1 is denoted by ξ ∈ Ξ, where Ξ is a
ﬁnite or countable set (see Fudenberg and Levine (1992) for the uncountable
case). Player 2’s prior belief about 1’s type is given by the distribution µ,
11with support Ξ. The set of types is partitioned into a set of payoﬀ types Ξ1,
and a set of action types Ξ2 ≡ Ξ\Ξ1. Payoﬀ types maximize the average
discounted value of payoﬀs, which depend on their type and which may be
nonstationary,
u1 : A1 × A2 × Ξ1 × N0 → R.
Type ξ0 ∈ Ξ1 is the normal type of player 1, who happens to have a sta-
tionary payoﬀ function, given by the stage game in the benchmark game of
complete information,
u1(a,ξ0,t) = u1(a) ∀a ∈ A,∀t ∈ N0.
It is standard to think of the prior probability µ(ξ0) as being relatively large,
so the games of incomplete information are a seemingly small departure from
the underlying game of complete information, though there is no requirement
that this be the case.
Action types (also called commitment or behavioral types) do not have
payoﬀs, and simply play a speciﬁed repeated game strategy. For any repeated-
game strategy from the complete information game, ˆ σ1 : H1 → ∆(A1), de-
note by ξ(ˆ σ1) the action type committed to the strategy ˆ σ1. In general,
a commitment type of player 1 can be committed to any strategy in the
repeated game. If the strategy in question plays the same (pure or mixed)
stage-game action in every period, regardless of history, that type is called
a simple action type. For example, the H-action type in the product-choice
game is a simple action type. The (simple action) type that plays the pure
action a1 in every period is denoted by ξ(a1) and similarly the simple action
type committed to α1 ∈ ∆(A1) is denoted by ξ(α1). As will be seen soon,
allowing for mixed action types is an important generalization from simple
pure types.
A strategy for player 1, also denoted by σ1 : H1 × Ξ → ∆(A1), speciﬁes
for each type ξ ∈ Ξ a repeated game strategy such that for all ξ(ˆ σ1) ∈ Ξ2,
the strategy ˆ σ1 is speciﬁed. A strategy σ2 for player 2 is as in the complete
information game, i.e., σ2 : H → ∆(A2).
Deﬁnition 2 The strategy proﬁle (σ∗
1,σ∗
2) is a Nash equilibrium of the in-
complete information game if
1. for all ξ ∈ Ξ1, there does not exist a repeated game strategy σ1 yielding
a strictly higher payoﬀ for payoﬀ type ξ of player 1 when player 2 plays
σ∗
2, and
122. in all periods t, after any history ht ∈ H arising with positive proba-
bility under (σ∗
1,σ∗




where the expectation is taken over both the period t-private histories
that player 1 may have observed and player 1’s type.
Example 1 Consider the product-choice game (Figure 2) under perfect
monitoring. The ﬁrm is willing to commit to H to induce h from customers.
This incentive to commit is best illustrated by considering a sequential ver-
sion of the product-choice game: The ﬁrm ﬁrst publicly commits to an
eﬀort, and then the customer chooses between h and `, knowing the ﬁrm’s
choice. In this sequential game, the ﬁrm chooses H in the unique subgame
perfect equilibrium. Since Stackelberg (1934) was the ﬁrst investigation of
such leader-follower interactions, it is traditional to call H the Stackelberg
action, and the H-action type of player 1 the Stackelberg type, with asso-
ciated Stackelberg payoﬀ 2. Suppose Ξ = {ξ0,ξ(H),ξ(L)}. For δ ≥ 1/2,
the grim trigger strategy proﬁle of always playing Hh, with deviations pun-
ished by Nash reversion, is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the complete






H, if ξ = ξ(H),





h, if aτ = Hh for all τ < t,
`, otherwise.
In other words, player 2 and the normal type of player 1 follow the strategies
from the Nash-reversion equilibrium in the complete information game, and
the action types ξ(H) and ξ(L) play their actions.
This is a Nash equilibrium for δ ≥ 1/2 and µ(ξ(L)) < 1/2. The restric-
tion on µ(ξ(L)) ensures that player 2 ﬁnds h optimal in period 0. Should
player 2 ever observe L, then Bayes’ rule causes her to place probability 1
on type ξ(L) (if L is observed in the ﬁrst period) or the normal type (if
L is ﬁrst played in a subsequent period), making her participation in Nash
reversion optimal. The restriction on δ ensures that Nash reversion provides
suﬃcient incentive to make H optimal for the normal player 1. After ob-
serving a0
1 = H in period 0, player 2 assigns zero probability to ξ = ξ(L).
13However, the posterior probability that 2 assigns to the Stackelberg type
does not converge to 1. In period 0, the prior probability is µ(ξ(H)). After
one observation of H, the posterior increases to µ(ξ∗)/[µ(ξ∗) + µ(ξ0)], after
which it is constant. By stipulating that an observation of H in a history in
which L has previously been observed causes player 2 to place probability
one on the normal type of player 1, a speciﬁcation of player 2’s beliefs that
is consistent with sequentiality is obtained.
As seen in the introduction, for δ close to 1, σ1(ht,ξ0) = L for all ht is
not part of any Nash equilibrium. F
3.4 The Reputation Bound
Which type would the normal type most like to be treated as? Player 1’s







where B(a1) = argmaxa2 u2(a1,a2) is the set of player 2 myopic best replies
to a1. If the supremum is achieved by some action a∗








This is a pure action to which player 1 would commit, if player 1 had the
chance to do so (and hence the name “Stackelberg” action, see the discussion
in Example 1), given that such a commitment induces a best response from
player 2. If there is more than one such action for player 1, the action can
be chosen arbitrarily.
However, player 1 would typically prefer to commit to a mixed action. In
the product-choice game, for example, a commitment by player 1 to mixing
between H and L, with slightly larger probability on H, still induces player
2 to choose h and gives player 1 a larger payoﬀ than a commitment to H.







where B(α1) = argmaxa2 u2(α1,a2) is the set of player 2’s best responses
to α1. In the product-choice game, v∗
1 = 2, while v∗∗
1 = 5/2. Typically, the
14supremum is not achieved by any mixed action, and so there is no mixed-
action Stackelberg type. However, there are mixed action types that, if
player 2 is convinced she is facing such a type, will yield payoﬀs arbitrarily
close to the mixed-action Stackelberg payoﬀ.
As with imperfect monitoring, simple mixed action types under perfect
monitoring raise issues of monitoring, since a deviation by the normal type
from the distribution α1 of a mixed action type ξ(α1), to some action in the
support cannot be detected. However, when monitoring of the pure actions
is perfect, it is possible to statistically detect deviations, and this will be
enough to imply the appropriate reputation lower bound.
When monitoring is imperfect, the public signals are statistically infor-
mative about the actions of the long-lived player under the next assumption
(Lemma 1).
Assumption 1 For all a2 ∈ A2, the collection of probability distributions
{ρ(y | (a1,a2) : a1 ∈ A1} is linearly independent.
This assumption is trivially satisﬁed in the perfect monitoring case. Repu-
tation eﬀects still exist when this assumption fails, but the bounds are more
complicated to calculate (see Fudenberg and Levine (1992) or Mailath and
Samuelson (2006, Section 15.4.1)).
Fixing an action for player 2, a2, the mixed action α1 implies the signal
distribution
P
a1 ρ(y | (a1,a2))α1(a1).
Lemma 1 Suppose ρ satisﬁes Assumption 1. Then, if for some a2,
X
a1





then α1 = α0
1.
Proof. Suppose (4) holds for some a2. Let R denote the |Y | × |A1| matrix
whose y-a1 element is given by ρ(y | (a1,a2)) (so that the a1-column is the
probability distribution on Y implied by the action proﬁle a1a2). Then, (4)
can be written as Rα1 = Rα0
1, or more simply as R(α1 − α0
1) = 0. By
Assumption 1, R has full column rank, and so x = 0 is the only vector
x ∈ R|A1| solving Rx = 0.
Consequently, if player 2 believes that the long-lived player’s behavior
implies a distribution over the signals close to the distribution implied by
some particular action α0
1, then player 2 must believe that the long-lived
player’s action is also close to α0
1. Since A2 is ﬁnite, this then implies
15that when player 2 is best responding to some belief about the long-lived
player’s behavior implying a distribution over signals suﬃciently close to the
distribution implied by α0
1, then player 2 is in fact best responding to α0
1.
We are now in a position to state the main reputation bound result. Let
¯
v1(ξ0,µ,δ) be the inﬁmum over the set of the normal player 1’s payoﬀs in any
(pure or mixed) Nash equilibrium in the incomplete information repeated
game, given the distribution µ over types and the discount factor δ.
Proposition 1 (Fudenberg and Levine (1989, 1992)) Suppose ρ sat-
isﬁes Assumption 1 and let ˆ ξ denote the simple action type that always plays
ˆ α1 ∈ ∆(A1). Suppose µ(ξ0), µ(ˆ ξ) > 0. For every η > 0, there is a value K
such that for all δ,
¯





This immediately yields the pure action Stackelberg reputation bound.
Fix ε > 0. Taking ˆ α1 in the proposition as the degenerate mixture that
plays the Stackelberg action a∗
1 with probability 1, equation (5) becomes
¯
v1(ξ0,µ,δ) ≥(1 − η)δKv∗




1 − (1 − (1 − η)δK)2M,
where M ≡ maxa1 |u1(a)|. This last expression is at least as large as v∗
1 − ε
when η < ε/(2M) and δ is suﬃciently close to 1.
The mixed action Stackelberg reputation bound is also covered:
Corollary 1 Suppose ρ satisﬁes Assumption 1 and µ assigns positive prob-
ability to some sequence of simple types {ξ(αk
1)}∞











For all ε0 > 0, there exists
¯






The remainder of this subsection outlines a proof of Proposition 1. Fix
a strategy proﬁle (σ1,σ2) (which may be Nash, but at this point of the
discussion, need not be). The beliefs µ then induce a probability distribution
P on the set of outcomes, which is the set of possible inﬁnite histories
(denoted by h∞)and realized types, (Y × A)∞ × Ξ ≡ Ω. The probability
16measure P describes how the short-lived players believe the game will evolve,
given their prior beliefs µ about the types of the long-lived player. Let ˆ P
denote the probability distribution on the set of outcomes induced by (σ1,σ2)
and the action type ˆ ξ. The probability measure ˆ P describes how the short-
lived players believe the game will evolve if the long-lived player’s type is
ˆ ξ. Finally, let ˜ P denote the probability distribution on the set of outcomes
induced by (σ1,σ2) conditioning on the long-lived player’s type not being
the action type ˆ ξ. Then, P ≡ ˆ µˆ P + (1 − ˆ µ)˜ P, where ˆ µ ≡ µ(ˆ ξ).
The discussion after Lemma 1 implies that the optimal behavior of the
short-lived player in period t is determined by that player’s beliefs over the
signal realizations in that period. These beliefs can be viewed as a one-
step ahead prediction of the signal y that will be realized conditional on the
history ht, P(y | ht). Let ˆ µt(ht) = P(ˆ ξ | ht) denote the posterior probability
after observing ht that the short-lived player assigns to the long-lived player
having type ˆ ξ. Note also that if the long-lived player is the action type ˆ ξ,






P(y | ht) = ˆ µt(ht)ˆ P(y | ht) + (1 − ˆ µt(ht))˜ P(y | ht).
The key step in the proof of Proposition 1 is a statistical result on merg-
ing. The following lemma essentially says that the short-lived players cannot
be surprised too many times. Note ﬁrst that an inﬁnite public history h∞
can be thought of a sequence of ever longer ﬁnite public histories ht. Con-
sider the collection of inﬁnite public histories with the property that player 2
often sees histories ht that lead to very diﬀerent one-step ahead predictions
about the signals under ˜ P and under ˆ P and have a “low” posterior that
the long-lived player is ˆ ξ. The lemma asserts that if the long-lived player
is in fact the action type ˆ ξ, this collection of inﬁnite public histories has
low probability. Seeing the signals more likely under ˆ ξ leads the short-lived
players to increase the posterior probability on ˆ ξ. The posterior probability
fails to converge to 1 under ˆ P only if the play of the types diﬀerent from ˆ ξ
leads, on average, to a signal distribution similar to that implied by ˆ ξ. For
the purely statistical statement and its proof, see Mailath and Samuelson
(2006, Section 15.4.2).
Lemma 2 For all η,ψ > 0 and µ† ∈ (0,1], there exists a positive integer K
such that for all µ(ˆ ξ) ∈ [µ†,1], for every strategy σ1 : H1 × Ξ → ∆(A1) and








t ≥ 1 : (1 − ˆ µt(ht))max
y

 ˜ P(y | ht) − ˆ P(y | ht)







Note that the bound K holds for all strategy proﬁles (σ1,σ2) and all prior
probabilities µ(ˆ ξ) ∈ [µ†,1). This allows us to bound equilibrium payoﬀs.
Proof of Proposition 1.
Fix η > 0. From Lemma 1, by choosing ψ suﬃciently small in Lemma
2, with ˆ P-probability at least 1 − η, there are at most K periods in which
the short-lived players are not best responding to ˆ α1.
Since a deviation by the long-lived player to the simple strategy of always
playing ˆ α1 induces the same distribution on public histories as ˆ P, the long-
lived player’s expected payoﬀ from such a deviation is bounded below by
the right side of (5).
3.5 Temporary Reputation Eﬀects
Under perfect monitoring, there are often pooling equilibria in which the
normal and some action type of player 1 behave identically on the equilib-
rium path (as in Example 1). Deviations on the part of the normal player 1
are deterred by the prospect of the resulting punishment. Under imperfect
monitoring, such pooling equilibria do not exist. The normal and action
types may play identically for a long period of time, but the normal type
always eventually has an incentive to cheat at least a little on the com-
mitment strategy, contradicting player 2’s belief that player 1 will exhibit
commitment behavior. Player 2 must then eventually learn player 1’s type.
In addition to Assumption 1, disappearing reputation eﬀects require full
support monitoring.
Assumption 2 For all a ∈ A, y ∈ Y , ρ(y | a) > 0.
This assumption implies that Bayes’ rule determines the beliefs of player 2
about the type of player 1 after all histories.
Suppose there are only two types of player 1, the normal type ξ0 and a
simple action type ˆ ξ, where ˆ ξ = ξ(ˆ α1) for some ˆ α1 ∈ ∆(A1). The analysis
is extended to many commitment types in Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson
(2004, Section 6.1). It is convenient to denote a strategy for player 1 as a
pair of functions ˜ σ1 and ˆ σ1 (so ˆ σ1(ht
1) = ˆ α1 for all ht
1 ∈ H1), the former for
the normal type and the latter for the action type.
Recall that P ∈ ∆(Ω) is the unconditional probability measure induced
by the prior µ, and the strategy proﬁle (ˆ σ1, ˜ σ1,σ2), while ˆ P is the measure
18induced by conditioning on ˆ ξ. Since {ξ0} = Ξ \ {ˆ ξ}, ˜ P is the measure
induced by conditioning on ξ0. That is, ˆ P is induced by the strategy proﬁle
ˆ σ = (ˆ σ1,σ2) and ˜ P by ˜ σ = (˜ σ1,σ2), describing how play evolves when player
1 is the commitment and normal type, respectively.
The action of the commitment type satisﬁes the following assumption.
Assumption 3 Player 2 has a unique stage-game best response to ˆ α1 (de-
noted by ˆ a2) and ˆ α ≡ (ˆ α1,ˆ a2) is not a stage-game Nash equilibrium.
Let ˆ σ2 denote the strategy of playing the unique best response ˆ a2 to ˆ α1
in each period independently of history. Since ˆ α is not a stage-game Nash
equilibrium, (ˆ σ1, ˆ σ2) is not a Nash equilibrium of the complete information
inﬁnite horizon game.
Proposition 2 (Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004)) Suppose the
monitoring distribution ρ satisﬁes Assumptions 1 and 2, and the commit-
ment action ˆ α1 satisﬁes Assumption 3. In any Nash equilibrium of the game
with incomplete information, the posterior probability assigned by player 2
to the commitment type, ˆ µt, converges to zero under ˜ P, i.e.,
ˆ µt(ht) → 0, ˜ P-a.s.
The intuition is straightforward: Suppose there is a Nash equilibrium of
the incomplete information game in which both the normal and the action
type receive positive probability in the limit (on a positive probability set
of histories). On this set of histories, player 2 cannot distinguish between
signals generated by the two types (otherwise player 2 could ascertain which
type she is facing), and hence must believe that the normal and action types
are playing the same strategies on average. But then player 2 must play a
best response to this strategy, and hence to the action type. Since the
action type’s behavior is not a best response for the normal type (to this
player 2 behavior), player 1 must eventually ﬁnd it optimal to not play the
action-type strategy, contradicting player 2’s beliefs.
Assumption 3 requires a unique best response to ˆ α1. For example, in the
product-choice game, every action for player 2 is a best response to player
1’s mixture α0
1 that assigns equal probability to H and L. This indiﬀerence
can be exploited to construct an equilibrium in which (the normal) player 1
plays α0
1 after every history (Mailath and Samuelson, 2006, Section 7.6.2).
This will still be an equilibrium in the game of incomplete information in
which the commitment type plays α0
1, with the identical play of the normal
and commitment types ensuring that player 2 never learns player 1’s type.
19In contrast, player 2 has a unique best response to any other mixture on the
part of player 1. Therefore, if the commitment type is committed to any
mixed action other than α0
1, player 2 will eventually learn player 1’s type.
As in Proposition 1, a key step in the proof of Proposition 2 is a purely
statistical result on updating. Either player 2’s expectation (given her his-
tory) of the strategy played by the normal type ( ˜ E[ ˜ σt
1 | ht ], where ˜ E
denotes expectation with respect to ˜ P) is in the limit identical to the strat-
egy played by the action type (ˆ α1), or player 2’s posterior probability that
player 1 is the action type (ˆ µt(ht)) converges to zero (given that player 1 is
indeed normal). This is a merging argument and closely related to Lemma
2. If the distributions generating player 2’s signals are diﬀerent for the nor-
mal and action type, then these signals provide information that player 2
will use in updating her posterior beliefs about the type she faces. This
(converging, since beliefs are a martingale) belief can converge to an interior
probability only if the distributions generating the signals are asymptotically
uninformative, which requires that they be asymptotically identical.
Lemma 3 Suppose the monitoring distribution ρ satisﬁes Assumptions 1






 ˆ α1(a1) − ˜ E[ ˜ σt
1(a1) | ht ]

  = 0, ˜ P-a.s. (7)
Given Proposition 2, it should be expected that continuation play con-
verges to an equilibrium of the complete information game, and this is indeed
the case. See Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2004, Theorem 2) for the
formal statement.
Proposition 2 leaves open the possibility that for any period T, there may
be equilibria in which uncertainty about player 1’s type survives beyond T,
even though such uncertainty asymptotically disappears in any equilibrium.
This possibility cannot arise. The existence of a sequence of Nash equilibria
with uncertainty about player 1’s type persisting beyond period T → ∞
would imply the (contradictory) existence of a limiting Nash equilibrium in
which uncertainty about player 1’s type persists.
Proposition 3 (Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson (2007)) Suppose the
monitoring distribution ρ satisﬁes Assumptions 1 and 2, and the commit-
ment action ˆ α1 satisﬁes Assumption 3. For all ε > 0, there exists T such
that for any Nash equilibrium of the game with incomplete information,
˜ P(ˆ µt < ε, ∀t > T) > 1 − ε.
20Example 2 Recall that in the product-choice game, the unique player 2
best response to the H is to play h, and Hh is not a stage-game Nash
equilibrium. Proposition 1 ensures that the normal player 1’s expected value
in the repeated game of incomplete information with the H-action type is
arbitrarily close to 2, when player 1 is very patient. In particular, if the
normal player 1 plays H in every period, then player 2 will at least eventually
play her best response of h. If the normal player 1 persisted in mimicking
the action type by playing H in each period, this behavior would persist
indeﬁnitely. It is the feasibility of such a strategy that lies at the heart of
the reputation bounds on expected payoﬀs. However, this strategy is not
optimal. Instead, player 1 does even better by attaching some probability to
L, occasionally reaping the rewards of his reputation by earning a stage-game
payoﬀ even larger than 2. The result of such equilibrium behavior, however,
is that player 2 must eventually learn player 1’s type. The continuation
payoﬀ is then bounded below 2 (recall (1)). F
Reputation eﬀects arise when player 2 is uncertain about player 1’s type,
and there may well be a long period of time during which player 2 is suf-
ﬁciently uncertain of player 1’s type (relative to the discount factor), and
in which play does not resemble an equilibrium of the complete information
game. Eventually, however, such behavior must give way to a regime in
which player 2 is (correctly) convinced of player 1’s type.
For any prior probability ˆ µ that the long-lived player is the commitment
type and for any ε > 0, there is a discount factor δ suﬃciently large that
player 1’s expected payoﬀ is close to the commitment-type payoﬀ. This
holds no matter how small ˆ µ. However, for any ﬁxed δ and in any equi-
librium, there is a time at which the posterior probability attached to the
commitment type has dropped below the corresponding critical value of ˆ µ,
becoming too small (relative to δ) for reputation eﬀects to operate.
A reasonable response to the results on disappearing reputation eﬀects is
that a model of long-run reputations should incorporate some mechanism by
which the uncertainty about types is continually replenished. For example,
Holmstr¨ om (1982), Cole, Dow, and English (1995), Mailath and Samuelson
(2001), and Phelan (2006) assume that the type of the long-lived player is
governed by a stochastic process rather than being determined once and for
all at the beginning of the game. In such a situation, reputation eﬀects can
indeed have long-run implications.
213.6 Reputation as a State
The posterior probability that short-lived players assign to player 1 being
ˆ ξ is sometimes interpreted as player 1’s reputation, particularly if ˆ ξ is the
Stackelberg type. When Ξ contains only the normal type and ˆ ξ, the pos-
terior belief ˆ µt is a state variable of the game, and attention is sometimes
restricted to Markov strategies (i.e., strategies that only depend on histo-
ries through their impact on the posterior beliefs of the short-lived players).
An informative example is Benabou and Laroque (1992), who study the
Markov perfect equilibria of a game in which the uninformed players re-
spond continuously to their beliefs. They show that the informed player
eventually reveals his type in any Markov perfect equilibrium. On the other
hand, Markov equilibria need not exist in ﬁnitely repeated reputation games
(Mailath and Samuelson, 2006, Section 17.3).
The literature on reputation eﬀects has typically not restricted attention
to Markov strategies, since the results do not require the restriction.
4 Two Long-Lived Players
The introduction of nontrivial intertemporal incentives for the uninformed
player signiﬁcantly reduces reputation eﬀects. For example, when only sim-
ple Stackelberg types are considered, the Stackelberg payoﬀ may not bound
equilibrium payoﬀs. The situation is further complicated by the possibil-
ity of non-simple commitment types (i.e., types that follow nonstationary
strategies).
Consider applying the logic from Section 3.4 to obtain the Stackelberg
reputation bound when both players are long-lived and player 1’s character-
istics are unknown, under perfect monitoring. The ﬁrst step is to demon-
strate that, if the normal player 1 persistently plays the Stackelberg action
and there exists a type committed to that action, then player 2 must eventu-
ally attach high probability to the event that the Stackelberg action is played
in the future. This argument, a simple version of Lemma 2, depends only
upon the properties of Bayesian belief revision, independently of whether
the person holding the beliefs is a long-lived or short-lived player.
When player 2 is short-lived, the next step is to note that if she expects
the Stackelberg action, then she will play a best response to this action. If
player 2 is instead a long-lived player, she may have an incentive to play
something other than a best response to the Stackelberg type.
The key step when working with two long-lived players is thus to es-
tablish conditions under which, as player 2 becomes increasingly convinced
22that the Stackelberg action will appear, player 2 must eventually play a best
response to that action. One might begin such an argument by observing
that, as long as player 2 discounts, any losses from not playing a current
best response must be recouped within a ﬁnite length of time. But if player
2 is “very” convinced that the Stackelberg action will be played not only
now but for suﬃciently many periods to come, there will be no opportunity
to accumulate subsequent gains, and hence player 2 might just as well play
a stage-game best response.
Once it is shown that player 2 is best responding to the Stackelberg
action, the remainder of the argument proceeds as in the case of a short-
lived player 2. The normal player 1 must eventually receive very nearly the
Stackelberg payoﬀ in each period of the repeated game. By making player
1 suﬃciently patient (relative to player 2, so that discount factors diﬀer),
this consideration dominates player 1’s payoﬀs, putting a lower bound on
the latter. Hence, the obvious handling of discount factors is to ﬁx player
2’s discount factor δ2, and to consider the limit as player 1 becomes patient,
i.e., δ1 approaching one.
This intuition misses the following possibility. Player 2 may be choosing
something other than a best response to the Stackelberg action out of fear
that a current best response may trigger a disastrous future punishment.
This punishment would not appear if player 2 faced the Stackelberg type, but
player 2 can be made conﬁdent only that she faces the Stackelberg action, not
the Stackelberg type. The fact that the punishment lies oﬀ the equilibrium
path makes it diﬃcult to assuage player 2’s fear of such punishments. Short-
lived players in the same situation are similarly uncertain about the future
ramiﬁcations of best responding, but being short-lived, this uncertainty does
not aﬀect their behavior.
Consequently, reputation eﬀects are typically weak with two long-lived
players under perfect monitoring: Celentani, Fudenberg, Levine, and Pe-
sendorfer (1996) and Cripps and Thomas (1997), describe examples with
only the normal and the Stackelberg types of player 1, in which the future
play of the normal player 1 is used to punish player 2 for choosing a best re-
sponse to the Stackelberg action when she is not supposed to, and player 1’s
payoﬀ is signiﬁcantly below the Stackelberg payoﬀ. Moreover, the robust-
ness of reputation eﬀects to additional types beyond the Stackelberg type, a
crucial feature of settings with one long-lived player, does not hold with two
long-lived players. Schmidt (1993b) showed that the possibility of a “punish-
ment” type can prevent player 2 best responding to the Stackelberg action,
while Evans and Thomas (1997) showed that the Stackelberg bound is valid
if in addition to the Stackelberg type, there is an action type who punishes
23player 2 for not behaving appropriately (see Mailath and Samuelson (2006,
Sections 16.1 and 16.5)).
Imperfect monitoring (of both players’ actions), on the other hand, res-
cues reputation eﬀects. With a suﬃciently rich set of commitment types,
player 1 can be assured of at least his Stackelberg payoﬀ. Indeed, player 1
can often be assured of an even higher payoﬀ, in the presence of commitment
types who play nonstationary strategies (Celentani, Fudenberg, Levine, and
Pesendorfer, 1996). At the same time, these reputation eﬀects are temporary
(Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson, 2007, Theorem 2).
Finally, there is a literature on reputation eﬀects in bargaining games
(see Chatterjee and Samuelson (1987, 1988), Schmidt (1993a), and Abreu
and Gul (2000)), where the issues described above are further complicated
by the need to deal with the bargaining model itself.
5 Future Directions
The detailed structure of equilibria of the incomplete information game is
not well understood, even for the canonical game of Section 3. A more
complete description of the structure of equilibria is needed.
While much of the discussion was phrased in terms of the Stackelberg
type, Proposition 1 provides a reputation bound for any action type. While
in some settings, it is natural that the uninformed players assign strictly pos-
itive probability to the Stackelberg type, it is not natural in other settings.
A model endogenizing the nature of action types would be an important
addition to the reputation literature.
Finally, while the results on reputation eﬀects with two long-lived players
are discouraging, there is still the possibility that some modiﬁcation of the
model will rescue reputation eﬀects in this important setting.
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